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BANKRUPTCY LAW
REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.
Brotherhood of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc.
Section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act' authorizes a court conducting a Chapter XI arrangement proceeding 2 to permit the
debtor to reject an executory contract 3 upon notice to the other
parties to the contract. Problems arise, however, if the executory
contract contains an agreement to bargain collectively with a labor
union since the rejection of such an agreement appears to clash
with federal labor legislation 4 protecting collective bargaining
agreements. 5 Focusing on this controversy, in Shopmen's Local 455 v.
Kevin Steel Products, Inc.,6 and Brotherhood of Railway Employees v.
PLEA Express, Inc.,7 the Second Circuit ruled that collective barIUpon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers,
and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the
parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may
designate ....
Bankruptcy Act § 313(1), 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970).
2 A Chapter XI arrangement is "any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or
extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms." Id. § 306(1), 11
U.S.C. § 706(1). This proceeding "is designed to furnish a broad form of debtor relief
proceedings with respect to unsecured debts." 9 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAw § 3564, at
198-99 (6th ed. 1955). The Chapter XI arrangement provisions were incorporated into the
Bankruptcy Act in 1938. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 701 etseq. (1970)).
Chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act deal with straight bankruptcy, which
involves the liquidation of the debtor. Chapters VIII through XV, on the other hand,
contemplate rehabilitation of the debtor. See 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
0.01 (14th ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
3 The Act itself does not define "executory contract." One authority, however, has
explained that the type of contract contemplated is one
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)
(footnote omitted). For a further discussion of the meaning of "executory contract" see 8
COLLIER, supra note 2,
3.15[3].
4 See notes 29-30 & 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
5A collective bargaining agreement is an "[a]greement between an employer and a labor
union which regulates terms and conditions of employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329
(4th rev. ed. 1968). As the Supreme Court has noted, "[a] collective bargaining agreement is
not an ordinary contract for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the
same old common-law concepts which control such private contracts." TransportationCommunication Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61, (1966) (citations omitted).
519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g and remanding 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
7 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 451 (1975), aff'g and remanding Civil No.
75-B-253 (S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1975).
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gaining agreements may be rejected as executory contracts within
the purview of section 313(1).8
In Kevin Steel, the debtor-in-possession, 9 Kevin Steel, was a
steel fabricator and erector. In June of 1973, one of its unions filed
a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging
that the company had violated the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 10 by refusing to sign a new collective bargaining agreement after the former one had expired.' The administrative law
judge ruled that Kevin Steel had committed the alleged violations,
and in March 1974 the NLRB ordered the employer to execute a
new bargaining agreement with the union.1 2 At the time these
labor issues were being litigated, Kevin Steel petitioned the bankruptcy court for an arrangement under Chapter XI and later
requested permission to reject the collective bargaining agreement
in question as an "onerous executory contract.' 3 In March 1974
the bankruptcy court, over strong union objections, permitted
Kevin Steel, as a debtor-in-possession, to reject the challenged
agreement, 14 but the union obtained a reversal of this determination in the district court.' 5 Kevin Steel's appeal from that decision
was subsequently consolidated before the Second Circuit with the
NLRB's petition for enforcement of its order. 6 Judge Feinberg,
writing for a unanimous panel,1 7 held that section 313(1) gives the
bankruptcy court the power to permit, in its discretion, the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 1 8 Accordingly, the
8Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 706; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169.

9A debtor-in-possession is a debtor who continues in possession of his property where
no receiver or trustee is appointed in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742
(1970); see In re Hammond Standish & Co., 126 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1954). Subject
to the court's control, the debtor-in-possession has the power to continue managing the
business for a period of time fixed by the court and must report back to the court at
designated intervals. Bankruptcy Act § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
"0 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
11519 F.2d at 700. The union contended that Kevin Steel had refused to sign a new
collective bargaining agreement in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970),
quoted in note 29 infra. In addition, it was alleged that Kevin Steel had offered an employee
inducement to leave the union and had laid off and terminated the employment of union
members in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
12See 519 F.2d at 700-01.
131d. at 700.
'4See id.
"5The district court ruled that a collective bargaining agreement could not be considered an executory contract subject to rejection under § 313(1). 381 F. Supp. at 338.
16 At the same time that the employer appealed from the district court's decision, the
NLRB petitioned the Second Circuit for enforcement of its order that Kevin Steel sign a
collective bargaining agreement and reinstate with compensation the discharged employees.
The parties' joint motion for consolidation was granted by the Second Circuit. See 519 F.2d
at 701.
1Joining Judge Feinberg were Judges Oakes and Van Graafeiland.
'8 519 F.2d at 706.
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Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the bankruptcy judge had properly exercised his
discretion.' 9
In REA Express, decided only a month after Kevin Steel, 20 the
debtor, REA Express, a surface and air transport carrier, was a
party to collective bargaining agreements with two unions. 2 ' REA
filed a Chapter XI petition and, like Kevin Steel, was permitted to
continue its business operations as a debtor-in-possession. 2 2 Thereafter REA, claiming it could not continue operations unless its costs
were significantly reduced, moved for an order authorizing its
rejection of the two collective bargaining agreements as "onerous
and burdensome. ' 23 The bankruptcy court held that such a
rejection was not within the scope of Chapter XI, 24 but the district

court reversed, finding no evidence of any limitation on the type of
executory contract that a debtor-in-possession may reject under
section 313(1).25 The Second Circuit, following its reasoning in

Kevin Steel, held that a collective bargaining agreement subject to
the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 2 6 was an executory contract which
could, with the court's permission, be rejected under section
313(1). Judge Mansfield, writing for a unanimous panel, 27 remanded
the case to the district court for a determination as to whether the
collective bargaining agreements ought to be rejected as onerous
28
and burdensome executory contracts.
In evaluating the central issue in each of the two cases, the
Second Circuit first considered the arguments presented by the
unions. In Kevin Steel, Shopmen's Local 455 contended that
21Id.

at 706-07.
°See 523 F.2d at 166.
21 The two unions in collective bargaining relationships with REA were the Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks and the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers.
22 523 F.2d at 167.
231d. REA's motion for an order authorizing rejection of the collective bargaining
agreements was made on March 24, 1975. One agreement was not due to expire until
December 31, 1975, the other until June 1, 1976. The Second Circuit summarized the
reasons for REA's complaint that the collective bargaining agreements were onerous and
burdensome as follows:
(1) their supplemental unemployment and consolidation provisions would completely forestall the debtor, which is insolvent, from adopting and implementing a
reorganization plan that would enable it to survive, and (2) the debtor cannot meet
the full wage scales provided for in the agreements.
Id.
24 See id.
22 Civil No. 75-B-253 at 2.
2645 U.S.C. §§ 151 elseq. (1970).
27
Joining Judge Mansfield were Judge Mulligan and Justice Clark, retired, sitting by
designation.
28 523 F.2d at 172.
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application of section 313(1) to collective bargaining agreements
would contradict sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA. Section
8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with his employees' representative. 29 Section
8(d) prohibits the termination or modification of a collective
bargaining agreement without compliance with the rigorous procedures outlined in that section. 30 The union further maintained
that granting the bankruptcy court authority to permit rejection of
collective bargaining agreements would seriously undermine essen31
tial NLRA policies.
In REA Express, the Brotherhood of Railway Employees and
the International Association of Machinists raised analogous arguments with respect to the RLA.3 2 Section 2 of that Act forbids a
carrier to change working conditions of employees in any way
except as prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement itself or
in section 6 of the Act. 33 Section 6 sets forth a protracted proce29 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
30 Section 8(d) provides, in pertinent part, that no party to a collective bargaining
agreement shall terminate or modify it unless he:
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract ...
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service... and ... any State or
Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the
State or Territory . . . ;
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after
such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later:
. . . [T]he duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to
discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a
contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such
terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
3, The union alleged that judicial sanction of Kevin Steel's construction of § 313(1)
would enable an employer to "accomplish indirectly what it could not do directly without
violating the Labor Act, namely, the unilateral termination of a labor agreement during its
term." 519 F.2d at 702. Moreover, allowing employers to reject collective bargaining agreements, the union argued, would impair industrial peace, one of the central purposes of the
NLRA, since employees would be forced to resort to strikes as the only means for protecting
their interests. Id. at 703.
32 See 523 F.2d at 168.
33 Section 2 provides in part:
No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the
manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
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dure for amending the collective bargaining agreement, requiring,
34
inter alia, at least 30 days' written notice of any proposed change.
The unions argued that since REA was a carrier, the bankruptcy
of its executory contracts without
court could not permit rejection
35
provisions.
these
to
adhering
Although the Second Circuit rejected the unions' arguments in
both cases, it did so only after careful assessment of a number of
factors: the practical functions of a bankruptcy proceeding; 36 the
particular language employed in the Bankruptcy Act; 37 and the
available case law. 38 In both instances the court emphasized the
bankrupt's special status as a debtor-in-possession. The Second
Circuit reasoned that a debtor-in-possession, as a newly created
entity very different from the prebankruptcy debtor, is not a party
to any prebankruptcy labor agreement between the debtor and a
union. 39 Indeed, the power conferred by section 313(1) to reject
executory contracts was thought to be predicated on the very fact
that the new entity has its own rights and duties subject to the
control of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the Second Circuit
concluded that absent a specific assumption of the old agreement,
the new entity is not bound by any terms of a collective bargaining
40
agreement contracted by the debtor prior to bankruptcy.
In Kevin Steel the court also rejected the union's contention
that Congress, due to the unique nature of labor agreements,
intended to exclude collective bargaining agreements from section
313(1).41 The court agreed with the union's premise that a
collective bargaining agreement differs from an ordinary contract
in several respects. 4 2 Such an agreement, which has been referred
to as a "generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
3

4Id.§ 156. Section 6 prescribes a procedure for changing rates of pay, employee rules,
and working conditions. It provides for a minimum of 30 days' written notice of any such
change and an involved procedure for resolving differences between the parties. During the
time of such attempted resolution of the controversy, no changes may be unilaterally
effected by the carrier. 523 F.2d at 168.
35523 F.2d at 168.
"See text accompanying note- 39-40 infra.
37 See text accompanying notes 48-54 infra.
38 See notes 55-67 and accompanying text infra. Other decisions, not directly on point,
but cited by the court, include In re Capital Serv., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 430, 437-38 (S.D. Cal.
1955); In re American R.R. of P.R., 110 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D.P.R. 1952), affd per curiam, 202
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1953); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
rev'd in part, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947); and In re Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478,
479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
3
9'Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170.
4'Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170.
41 519 F.2d at 703.
42

1d. at 705.
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draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate, ' 43 typically "covers the whole
employment relationship. '4 4 Often, the agreement is not a voluntary contractual relationship, 5 but an "outline of the common law
of a particular plant or industry. 4 I Nevertheless, the Kevin Steel
court concluded that absent specific evidence to the contrary,
uniqueness alone is not a valid basis for exclusion under section
7
313(1).4
Since legislative history offers no indication of Congress'
intended definition of executory contracts, 48 the Second Circuit
focused its attention on the Bankruptcy Act itself.4 9 The court
found it particularly noteworthy that while section 313(1) makes no
exception for collective bargaining agreements, section 77(n) specifically protects "railroad employees" from having their wages or
working conditions changed in any way except as outlined in the
RLA. 50 This distinction, the Second Circuit contended, demonstrates that Congress, had it so intended, could have removed labor
agreements from the scope of section 313(1).51 The court found
the unions' assertion that the absence of any such limitation from
section 313(1) was attributable to "legislative oversight" especially
unpersuasive in light of the numerous opportunities Congress had
to cure such a deficiency. 2 In view of the clear legislative intent
and case law supporting the specific exclusion of railroads from the
general operation of bankruptcy law,5 3 in the court's opinion there
43 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960),
citing Shulman, Reason, Contract, and the Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999,
1004-05 (1955). For a further discussion of the nature of collective bargaining agreements,
see Chamberlain, Collective Bargainingand the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 829
(1948).
44 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960)
(footnote omitted).
45
1d. at 580; John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
46 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 285 (1972), citing John Wiley
& Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). For a discussion of both Burns and Wiley, see
Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975).
47 519 F.2d at 704-05.
48
See S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1938).
45
Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 703. An examination of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973

is also helpful in this regard. See

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF

THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 12 (1973). Section 4-602 of
the Proposed Act, which corresponds to the present § 313(1), covers the rejection of
executory contracts. A commentator's note to the section states that the term "executory
contract" is undefined, but "its general meaning in the Bankruptcy Act is well understood."
Id. at 155. It can be inferred from this statement that inasmuch as no exception for collective
bargaining agreements exists under the present § 313(1), no such exception is contemplated
by the Proposed Act.
55
See 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970).
5 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169.
2
5 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 705.
' 31d., citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682,
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was no reason to assume that the exemption of railroad employees
was meant to exclude all employees from the Bankruptcy Act's
54
operation.
As the Second Circuit recognized, there appear to be no
appellate decisions precisely on point. 55 The court's analysis is
consonant, however, with district court precedent concerning
section 313(1) as well as analogous provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act. For example, in Carpenter'sLocal 2746 v. Turney Wood Products,
Inc.,56 a straight bankruptcy proceeding, the court permitted the
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement as an executory
contract under section 70(b) of the Act.57 The Turney court
concluded that Congress would surely have provided an exception
for collective bargaining agreements had it desired one. 58 Similarly,
in In re Business Supplies Corporation of America,5 9 an unfulfilled
collective bargaining agreement was held to be an executory
contract since the court reasoned that it would be contrary to the
purpose of Chapter XI to read an exception into section 313(1)
60
where none existed.
Other authorities are also in unison with the Second Circuit's
decision that for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act's section 313(1) a
687-89 (1963) (discussion of particular economic problems confronting railroad industry);
see H.R. REP. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933). Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 205 (1970), was enacted in 1933 when many railroads, suffering from generally
adverse economic conditions, were confronted with the necessity to reorganize. It was
designed to avoid the expense and waste involved in the administration of equity
receiverships. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV.
479, 496-98 (1974); Note, Regional Rail ReorganizationAct of 1973: Was Congress on the Right
Track?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 98, 102 n.30 (1974).
"4 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 705. As the court noted in In re Business Supplies Corp. of
America, 72 CCH Lab. Cas. 27,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
Congress' expression in 11 U.S.C. § 205 demonstrated its solicitude for railway
workers based on its concern for continued health of the interstate railway system
of the country.... But Congress expressed n6 such solicitude for other workers in
the ordinary garden variety reorganization proceeding whether in Chapter X or in
Chapter XI.
Id. at 27,978-79.
5
See 519 F.2d at 703-04, where the Kevin Steel court expressed its views as to why the
precise issue here involved has been litigated so infrequently.
"6289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968) (mem.), discussed in Comment, Collective Bargaining
and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 477, 479-80 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Collective
Bargaining].
" 289 F. Supp. at 149. Section 70(b) was applicable in Turney because the business was
being liquidated. This section provides in pertinent part:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract ... within sixty days after
the adjudication or within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee,
whichever is later .... Any such contract or lease not assumed or rejected within
that time shall be deemed to be rejected ..
11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
s' 289 F. Supp. at 149.
6s90 72 CCH Lab. Cas. 27,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1d.
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collective bargaining agreement is to be treated as an executory
contract. 61 In one of the leading treatises on bankruptcy law it is
unequivocally stated that "[t]here is no restriction on the type of
executory contract that may be rejected" under section 313.62 A
district court adopted this reasoning in In re Klaber Brothers63 to
permit the rejection of an executory collective bargaining agreement under section 313(1) as onerous and burdensome to the
bankrupt's estate. The Klaber court noted that the language of
section 313(1) placed no limitation on the type of executory
contract that could be rejected.6 4 Similarly, in In re Overseas
National Airways, Inc., 65 the court rejected the petitioner's argument
that collective bargaining agreements are not executory contracts
within the scope of section 313(1). Nevertheless, the court refused
to permit the debtor, an air carrier, to reject the collective
bargaining agreement in question since it found the company's
employees to be protected by section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act,
which prescribes an exclusive means for the disaffirmance of such
agreements.6 6 The court noted, however, that had the carrier not
come within the section 77(n) exception, the bankruptcy court
would have had the power to reject the agreement as an executory
6
contract. '
The small amount of legal precedent available, therefore,
strongly supports the findings of the Second Circuit in Kevin Steel
and REA Express. The court of appeals was careful to note,
however, that section 313(1) does not mandate rejection of executory contracts. Rather, the decision whether or not to permit
rejection is solely within the discretion of the court. 68 It has been
noted that an executory contract should be rejected when such
action would work to the advantage of the bankrupt's estate.69
61 See, e.g., Countryman, Executoy Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part11, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479,
492-98 (1974); Collective Bargaining, supra note 56, at 478.
62 8 COLLIER, supra note 2,

3.15[1].
63 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
64Id. at 84-85.
65 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).

"I1d. at 360. The Overseas Airwvay. court construed § 77(n) to apply to any collective
bargaining agreement governed by the RLA. Yet, the language of § 77(n) expressly protects
only "railroad employees" from having their wages and working conditions altered by a
judge or trustee acting under the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970). Indeed, in
REA Express the district court held that § 77(n) applies only to railroad employees, thus
excluding REA's employees from that section's protection. The court characterized the
Overseas 4irways case as "distinguishable on its facts," but also noted that even if the case had
been applicable it would not have been followed. Civil No. 75-B-253 at 3.
67 238 F. Supp. at 360-61.
6
Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 706-07; 8 COLLIER, supra note 2,
3.15[8].
6 8 COLLIER, supra note 2,
3.15[8]; In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
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Since the party injured by the rejection of the contract becomes a
creditor with a claim for damages, whether the executory contract
ought to be rejected should be decided in light of the resultant
increase in the debtor's liability.7 0 Nonetheless, absent bad faith on
the part of the debtor-in-possession, courts generally permit the
rejection of an executory contract if the detriment occasioned by
71
performance is greater than the benefit to be gained thereby.
Alteration of this general rule is appropriate, however, in the case
of the proposed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
because federal labor legislation is also involved. Accordingly, the
Second Circuit, in remanding both Kevin Steel and REA Express,
carefully set forth the factors which must be scrutinized and balanced by the court in such a case.
The Second Circuit explained that in addition to evaluating
the financial situation of the debtor-in-possession, a court must give
due consideration to the policies underlying labor legislation. 72 Echoing the statement of the court in Overseas Airways, the Kevin Steel
panel emphasized that if a debtor rejects a collective bargaining
agreement, many employees are affected in areas such as union
73
benefits, including pension and welfare rights, and seniority.
According to the Second Circuit, therefore, the harm to the employees must be balanced against the Bankruptcy Act's intent to
give the debtor a fresh financial start in a favorable arrangement
plan. 4 The REA Express court concluded that
70 8 COLLIER, supra note 2, 3.15[8]. Of course, rejection by the debtor does not, in and
of itself, make the other party to the contract a creditor. For such a party to be deemed a
creditor there must also be an injury as a result of the rejection. Id.
7' Collective Bargaining,supra note 56, at 481. In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), is illustrative of the consequences of bad faith on the part of the party
seeking rejection. There, the court refused to permit a trustee in bankruptcy to reject a
collective bargaining agreement because the employer had previously contracted with the
union not to take any such action in the event of reorganization. Id. at 480.
72 In Kevin Steel the court stated that its "concern that the important policies underlying
the Labor Act be respected in decisions whether to allow rejection of collective bargaining
agreements would lead [it] to a careful scrutiny of the bankruptcy court's exercise of
discretion." 519 F.2d at 707. In REA Express the court remanded "substantially for the
reasons stated in remanding Kevin Steel." 523 F.2d at 172.
,3 519 F.2d at 707, quoting In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1965). According to the Overseas Airways court:
[T]he Bankruptcy Court, when it has the power to reject a collective bargaining
agreement, should do so only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of
the equities on both sides, for, in relieving a debtor from its obligations under a
collective bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the employees affected of their
seniority, welfare and pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are
incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim for money damages. That would
leave the employees without compensation for their losses, at the same time
enabling the debtor, at the expense of the employees, to consummate what may be a
more favorable plan of arrangement with its other creditors.
Id. (emphasis in original).
71See note 73 supra; Collective Bargaining,supra note 56, at 477-81.
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in view of the serious effects which rejection has on the carrier's
employees it should be authorized only where it clearly appears
to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is
rejected, the carrier will
collapse and the employees will no
75
longer have their jobs.
In Kevin Steel and REA Express, the debtors-in-possession were
treated as new entities not bound by collective bargaining agreements they had entered into prior to their filing of a Chapter XI
petition in bankruptcy.7 6 In its treatment of the debtors-inpossession, the court attempted to avoid conflict between bankruptcy policy designed "to preserve the funds of the [debtor] for
distribution to creditors and to give the [debtors] a new start"7 7 and
labor policy encouraging "creation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. 7 8 The Second Circuit's solution- to include collective bargaining agreements within the scope of section
313(1) once it is determined that the debtor is in economic
distress - treats unions and employees as creditors who must
renegotiate and even relinquish some rights "in order to maintain
the enterprise as a going concern so they can at least realize a
substantial percentage of what they would otherwise receive. '7 9 By
restricting the right to reject a collective bargaining agreement to
those situations where rejection is necessary to enable the debtorin-possession to remain viable, the Second Circuit has recognized
that the purposes of both the Bankruptcy Act and the labor acts
will be most effectively served if business operations and the
attendant employment opportunities are preserved. Moreover, this
reconciliation of bankruptcy and labor legislation appears to ensure
equitable treatment of employers and employees alike.
PatriciaAnne McLernon
75

523 F.2d at 172.

76 See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
77 Collective Bargaining, supra note 56, at 477.

78 Id. Other courts have similarly been called upon to reconcile the competing policies of
bankruptcy and labor legislation. In Durand v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (W.D. Ark.
1969) (mem.), the court stated that when the Bankruptcy Act and the NLRA "come into
contact with each other, they should, if possible, be so construed and applied as to avoid
conflicts between them .... " In Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 143, 148 (W.D. Ark. 1968) (mem.), the court contended that if the two bodies of law
were "read together and properly construed" there would be no conflict between federal
labor legislation and the Bankruptcy Act.
, REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169.

